Italy and Austria WW1
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ITALY DECLARES WAR ON AUSTRIA
For many years before the great war began the great powers of Europe were divided
into two great alliances, the Triple Entente, composed of Russia, France and England,
and the Triple Alliance, composed of Germany, Austria and Italy. When the war began
Italy refused to join with Germany and Austria. Why? The answer to this question
throws a vivid light on the origin of the war.
Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance; she knew the facts, not only what was
given to the public, but the inside facts. According to the terms of the alliance each
member was bound to stand by each other only in case of attack. Italy refused to join
with Austria and Germany because they were the aggressors. The constant assertions of
the German statesmen, and of the Kaiser himself, that war had been forced upon them
were declared untrue by their associate Italy in the very beginning, and the verdict of
Italy was the verdict of the world. Not much was said in the beginning about Italy's
abstention from war. The Germans, indeed, sneered a little and hinted that some day
Italy would be made to regret her course, but now that the Teuton snake is scotched the
importance of Italy's action has been perceived and appraised at its true value.
The Germans from the very beginning understood the real danger that might come to
the Central Powers through Italian action. Every effort was made by the foreign office to
keep her neutral. First threats were used, later promises were held out of addition to
Italian territory if she would send her troops to Germany's assistance. When this failed
the most strenuous efforts were made to keep Italy neutral, and a former German
premier, Prince von Bulow, was sent to Italy for this purpose. Socialist leaders, too, were
sent from Germany to urge the Italian Socialists to insist upon neutrality.
In July, 1914, the Italian Government was not taken by surprise. They had observed
the increase year by year of the German army and of the German fleet. At the end of the
Balkan wars they had been asked whether they would agree to an Austrian attack upon
Serbia. They had consequently long been deliberating as to what their course should be
in case of war, and they had made up their minds that under no circumstances would
they aid Germany against England.
Quite independently of her long-standing friendship with England it would be
suicide to Italy in her geographical position to enter a war which should permit her coast
to be attacked by the English and French navies, and her participation in the Triple
Alliance always carried the proviso that it did not bind her to fight England. This was
well known in the German foreign office, and, indeed, in France where the writers upon
war were reckoning confidently on the withdrawing of Italy from the Triple Alliance,
and planning to use the entire forces of France against Germany.
A better understanding of the Italian position will result from a consideration of the
origin of the Triple Alliance.
After the war of 1870, Bismarck, perceiving the quick recovery of France,
considered the advisability of attacking her again, and, to use his own words, "bleeding
her white." He found, however, that if this were attempted France would be joined by
Russia and England and he gave up this plan. In order, however, to render France
powerless he planned an alliance which should be able to control Europe. A league
between Germany, Austria and Russia was his desire, and for some time every
opportunity was taken to develop friendship with the Czar. Russia, however, remained
cool. Her Pan-Slavonic sympathies were opposed to the interests of Germany. Bismarck,
therefore, determined, without losing the friendship of Russia, to persuade Italy to join in
the continental combination. Italy, at the time, was the least formidable of the six great
powers, but Bismarck foresaw that she could be made good use of in such a
combination.
At that time Italy, just after the completion of Italian unity, found herself in great
perplexity. Her treatment of the Pope had brought about the hostility of Roman Catholics
throughout the world. She feared both France and Austria, who were strong Catholic
countries, and hardly knew where to look for friends. The great Italian leader at the time
was Francesco Crispi, who, beginning as a Radical and a conspirator, had become a
constitutional statesman.
Bismarck professed the greatest friendship for Crispi, and gave Crispi to understand that
he approved of Italy's aspirations on the Adriatic and in Tunis.
The next year, however, at the Berlin Congress, Italy's interests were ignored, and
finally, in 1882, France seized Tunis, to the great indignation of the Italians. It has been
shown in more recent times that the French seizure of Tunis was directly due to
Bismarck's instigation.
The Italians having been roused to wrath, Bismarck proceeded to offer them a place
in the councils of the Triple Alliance. It was an easy argument that such an alliance
would protect them against France, and no doubt it was promised that it would free them
from the danger of attack by Austria. England, at the time, was isolated, and Italy
continued on the best understanding with her.
The immediate result of the alliance was a growth of Italian hostility toward France,
which led, in 1889, to a tariff war on France. Meanwhile German commercial and
financial enterprises were pushed throughout the Italian peninsula. What did Italy gain
by this? Her commerce was weakened, and Austria permitted herself every possible
unfriendly act except open war.
As time went on Germany and Austria became more and more arrogant. Italy's
ambitions on the Balkan peninsula were absolutely ignored. In 1908 Austria
appropriated Bosnia and Herzegovina, another blow to Italy. By this time Italy
understood the situation well, and that same year, seeing no future for herself in Europe,
she swooped down on Tripoli. In doing this she forestalled Germany herself, for
Germany had determined to seize Tripoli.
Both Germany and Austria were opposed to this action of Italy, but Italy's eyes were
now open. Thirty years of political alliance had created no sympathy among the Italians
for the Germans. Moreover, it was not entirely a question of policy. The lordly arrogance
of the Prussians caused sharp antagonism. The Italians were lovers of liberty; the
Germans pledged toward autocracy. They found greater sympathy in England and in
France.
"I am a son of liberty," said Cavour, "to her I owe all that I am." That, too, is Italy's
motto. When the war broke out popular sympathy in Italy was therefore strongly in favor
of the Allies. The party in power, the Liberals, adopted the policy of neutrality for the
time being, but thousands of Italians volunteered for the French and British service, and
the anti-German feeling grew greater as time went on.
Finally, on the 23rd of May, 1915, the Italian Government withdrew its ambassador
to Austria and declared war. A complete statement of the negotiations between Italy and
Austria-Hungary, which led to this declaration, was delivered to the Government of the
United States by the Italian Ambassador on May 25th. This statement, of which the
following is an extract, lucidly presented the Italian position:
"The Triple Alliance was essentially defensive, and designed solely to preserve the
status quo, or in other words equilibrium, in Europe. That these were its only objects and
purposes is established by the letter and spirit of the treaty, as well as by the intentions
clearly described and set forth in official acts of the ministers who created the alliance
and confirmed and renewed it in the interests of peace, which always has inspired Italian
policy. The treaty, as long as its intents and purposes had been loyally interpreted and
regarded, and as long as it had not been used as a pretext for aggression against others,
greatly contributed to the elimination and settlement of causes of conflict, and for many
years assured to Europe the inestimable benefits of peace. But Austria-Hungary severed
the treaty by her own hands. She rejected the response of Serbia which gave to her all
the satisfaction she could legitimately claim. She refused to listen to the conciliatory
proposals presented by Italy in conjunction with other powers in the effort to spare
Europe from a vast conflict, certain to drench the Continent with blood and to reduce it
to ruin beyond the conception of human imagination, and finally she provoked that
conflict.
"Article first of the treaty embodied the usual and necessary obligation of such pacts-
-the pledge to exchange views upon any fact and economic questions of a general nature
that might arise pursuant to its terms. None of the contracting parties had the right to
undertake without a previous agreement any step the consequence of which might
impose a duty upon the other signatories arising under the alliance, or which would in
any way whatsoever encroach upon their vital interests.
This article was violated by Austria-Hungary, when she sent to Serbia her note dated
July 23, 1914, an action taken without the previous assent of Italy. Thus, Austria-
Hungary violated beyond doubt one of the fundamental provisions of the treaty. The
obligation of Austria-Hungary to come to a previous understanding with Italy was the
greater because her obstinate policy against Serbia gave rise to a situation which directly
tended toward the provocation of a European war.
"As far back as the beginning of July, 1914, the Italian Government, preoccupied by
the prevailing feeling in Vienna, caused to be laid before the Austro-Hungarian
Government a number of suggestions advising moderation, and warning it of the
impending danger of a European outbreak. The course adopted by Austria-Hungary
against Serbia constituted, moreover, a direct encroachment upon the general interests of
Italy both political and economical in the Balkan peninsula. Austria-Hungary could not
for a moment imagine that Italy could remain indifferent while Serbian independence
was being trodden upon. On a number of occasions theretofore, Italy gave Austria to
understand, in friendly but clear terms, that the independence of Serbia was considered
by Italy as essential to the Balkan equilibrium. Austria-Hungary was further advised that
Italy could never permit that equilibrium to be disturbed through a prejudice. This
warning had been conveyed not only by her diplomats in private conversations with
responsible Austro-Hungarian officials, but was proclaimed publicly by Italian
statesmen on the floors of Parliament.
"Therefore, when Austria-Hungary ignored the usual practices and menaced Serbia
by sending her an ultimatum, without in any way notifying the Italian Government of
what she proposed to do, indeed leaving that government to learn of her action through
the press, rather than through the usual channels of diplomacy, when Austria-Hungary
took this unprecedented course she not only severed her alliance with Italy but
committed an act inimical to Italy's interests....
"After the European war broke out Italy sought to come to an understanding with
Austria-Hungary with a view to a settlement satisfactory to both parties which might
avert existing and future trouble. Her efforts were in vain, notwithstanding the efforts of
Germany, which for months endeavored to induce Austria-Hungary to comply with
Italy's suggestion thereby recognizing the propriety and legitimacy of the Italian attitude.
Therefore Italy found herself compelled by the force of events to seek other solutions.
"Inasmuch as the treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary had ceased virtually to
exist and served only to prolong a state of continual friction and mutual suspicion, the
Italian Ambassador at Vienna was instructed to declare to the Austro-Hungarian
Government that the Italian Government considered itself free from the ties arising out
of the treaty of the Triple Alliance in so far as Austria-Hungary was concerned. This
communication was delivered in Vienna on May 4th.
"Subsequently to this declaration, and after we had been obliged to take steps for the
protection of our interests, the Austro-Hungarian Government submitted new
concessions, which, however, were deemed insufficient and by no means met our
minimum demands. These offers could not be considered under the circumstances. The
Italian Government taking into consideration what has been stated above, and supported
by the vote of Parliament and the solemn manifestation of the country came to the
decision that any further delay would be inadvisable. Therefore, on May 23d, it was
declared, in the name of the King, to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome, that,
beginning the following day, May 24th, it would consider itself in a state of war with
Austria-Hungary."
It was a closely reasoned argument that the Italian statesmen presented, but there was
something more than reasoned argument in Italy's course. She had been waiting for years
for the opportunity to bring under her flag the men of her own race still held in
subjection by hated Austria. Now was the time or never. Her people had become roused.
Mobs filled the streets. Great orators, even the great poet, D'Annunzio, proclaimed a
holy war. The sinking of the Lusitania poured oil on the flames, and the treatment of
Belgium and eastern France added to the fury.
Italian statesmen, even if they had so desired, could not have withstood the pressure.
It was a crusade for Italia Irredenta, for civilization, for humanity. The country had been
flooded by representatives of German propaganda, papers had been hired and, by all
report, money in large amounts distributed. But every German effort was swept away in
the flood of feeling. It was the people's war.
Amid tremendous enthusiasm the Chamber of Deputies adopted by vote of 407 to 74
the bill conferring upon the government full power to make war. All members of the
Cabinet maintained absolute silence regarding what step should follow the action of the
chamber. When the chamber reassembled on May 20th, after its long recess, there were
present 482 Deputies out of 500, the absentees remaining away on account of illness.
The Deputies especially applauded were those who wore military uniforms and who had
asked permission for leave from their military duties to be present at the sitting. All the
tribunes were filled to overflowing. No representatives of Germany, Austria or Turkey
were to be seen in the diplomatic tribune. The first envoy to arrive was Thomas Nelson
Page, the American Ambassador, who was accompanied by his staff. M. Barrere, Sir J.
Bennell Rodd, and Michel de Giers, the French, British and Russian Ambassadors,
respectively, appeared a few minutes later and all were greeted with applause, which was
shared by the Belgian, Greek and Roumanian ministers. George B. McClellan, one-time
mayor of New York, occupied a seat in the President's tribune.
A few minutes before the session began the poet, Gabrielle D'Annunzio, one of the
strongest advocates of war, appeared in the rear of the public tribune which was so
crowded that it seemed impossible to squeeze in anybody else. But the moment the
people saw him they lifted him shoulder high and passed him over their heads to the first
row.
The entire chamber, and all those occupying the other tribunes, rose and applauded
for five minutes, crying "Viva D'Annunzio!" Later thousands sent him their cards and in
return received his autograph bearing the date of this eventful day. Senor Marcora,
President of the Chamber, took his place at three o'clock. All the members of the House,
and everybody in the galleries, stood up to acclaim the old follower of Garibaldi.
Premier Salandra, followed by all the members of the Cabinet, entered shortly afterward.
It was a solemn moment. Then a delirium of cries broke out.
"Viva Salandra!" roared the Deputies, and the cheering lasted for a long time. After
the formalities of the opening, Premier Salandra, deeply moved by the demonstration,
arose and said:
"Gentlemen, I have the honor to present to you a bill to meet the eventual
expenditures of a national war."
The announcement was greeted by further prolonged applause. The Premier's speech
was continually interrupted by enthusiasm, and at times he could hardly continue on
account of the wild cheering. The climax was reached when he made a reference to the
army and navy. Then the cries seemed interminable, and those on the floor of the House
and in the galleries turned to the military tribune from which the officers answered by
waving their hands and handkerchiefs.
At the end of the Premier's speech there were deafening vivas for the King, war and
Italy. Thirty-four Socialists refused to join the cheers, even in the cry "Viva Italia!" and
they were hooted and hissed.
The action of the Italian Government created intense feeling. A newspaper man in
Vienna, describing the Austrian indignation, said:
"The exasperation and contempt which Italy's treacherous surprise attack and her
hypocritical justification aroused here, are quite indescribable. Neither Serbia nor
Russia, despite a long and costly war, is hated. Italy, however, or rather those Italian
would-be politicians and business men who offer violence to the majority of peaceful
Italian people, are unutterably hated." On the other hand German papers spoke with
much more moderation and recognized that Italy was acting in an entirely natural
manner.
On the very day on which war was declared active operations were begun. Both sides
had been making elaborate preparations. Austria had prepared herself by building strong
fortifications in which were employed the latest technical improvements in defensive
warfare. Upon the Carso and around Gorizia the Austrians had placed innumerable
batteries of powerful guns mounted on rails and protected by armor plates. They also had
a great number of medium and smaller guns. A net of trenches had been excavated and
constructed in cement all along the edge of the hills which dominated the course of the
Isonzo River.
ITALY'S TITANIC LABOR TO CONQUER THE ALPS
When the Italians were making their first mighty advance against Austria
descriptions came through of the almost unbelievable natural obstacles they were
conquering. Getting one of the monster guns into position in the mountains, as shown
above, over the track that had to be built for every foot of its progress, was one such
handicap.
THE HISTORIC LANDING FROM THE "RIVER CLYDE" AT SEDDUL BARR
An incident of the Dardanelles Expedition. Horrible losses were sustained by the
Allied troops from the concentrated fire of the Turkish machine guns on shore.
These trenches, occupying a position nearly impregnable because so mountainous,
were defended by every modern device. They were protected with numerous machine
guns, surrounded by wire entanglements through which ran a strong electric current.
These lines of trenches followed without interruption from the banks of the Isonzo to the
summit of the mountains which dominate it; they formed a kind of formidable staircase
which had to be conquered step by step with enormous sacrifice.
During this same period General Cadorna, then head of the Italian army, had been
bringing that army up to date, working for high efficiency and piling up munitions.
The Army of Italy was a formidable one. Every man in Italy is liable to military
service for a period of nineteen years from the age of twenty to thirty-nine.
At the time of the war the approximate war strength of the army was as follows:
Officers, 41,692; active army with the colors, 289,910; reserve, 638,979; mobile militia,
299,956; territorial militia, 1,889,659; total strength, 3,159,836. The above number of
total men available included upward of 1,200,000 fully trained soldiers, with perhaps
another 800,000 partially trained men, the remaining million being completely untrained
men. This army was splendidly armed, its officers well educated, and the men brave and
disciplined.
The Italian plan of campaign apparently consisted first, in neutralizing the Trentino
by capturing or covering the defenses and cutting the two lines of communication with
Austria proper, the railway which ran south from Insbruck, and that which ran southwest
from Vienna and joined the former at Fransensfets; and second, in a movement in force
on the eastern frontier, with Trieste captured or covered on the right flank in the
direction of the Austrian fortress at Klagenfurt and Vienna.
The first blow was struck by Austria on the day that war was declared. On that day
bombs were dropped on Venice, and five other Adriatic ports were shelled from air, and
some from sea. The Italian armies invaded Austria on the east with great rapidity, and by
May 27th a part of the Italian forces had moved across the Isonzo River to Monfalcone,
sixteen miles northwest of Trieste. Another force penetrated further to the north in the
Crown land of Gorizia, and Gradisca. Reports from Italy were that encounters with the
enemy had thus far been merely outpost skirmishes, but had allowed Italy to occupy
advantageous positions on Austrian territory.
By June 1st, the Italians had occupied the greater part of the west bank of the Isonzo,
with little opposition. The left wing was beyond the Isonzo, at Caporetto, fighting among
the boulders of Monte Nero, where the Austrian artillery had strong positions.
Monfalcone was kept under constant bombardment.
A general Italian advance took place on June 7th across the Isonzo River from
Caporetto to the sea, a distance of about forty miles. Monfalcone was taken by the
Italians on June the 10th, the first serious blow against Trieste, as Monfalcone was a
railway junction, and its electrical works operated the light and power of Trieste.
Next day the center made a great blow against Gradisca and Sagrado, but the river
line proved too strong. The only success was won that night at Plava, north of Borrigia,
which was carried by a surprise attack. The Isonzo was in flood, and presented a serious
obstacle to the onrush of the Italians. By June 14th the Italian eastern army had pushed
forward along the gulf of Trieste toward the town of Nebrosina, nine miles from Trieste.
Meanwhile, the Austrian armies were being constantly strengthened. The initial
weakness of the Austrian defensive was due to the fact that the armies normally assigned
to the invaded region had been sent to defend the Austrian line in Galicia against the
Russians. When Italy began her invasion the defenses of the country were chiefly in the
hands of hastily mobilized youths below the military age of nineteen, and men above the
military age of forty-two. From now on Austrian troops began to arrive from the
Galician front, some of these representing the finest fighting material in the Austrian
ranks. The chance of an easy victory was slipping from Italy's hands. The Italian
advance was checked.
On the 15th of June the Italians carried an important position on Monte Nero,
climbing the rocks by night and attacking by dawn. But this conquest did not help much.
No guns of great caliber could be carried on the mountain, and Tolmino, which had been
heavily fortified, and contained a garrison of some thirty thousand men, was entirely
safe. The following week there were repeated counter-attacks at Plava and on Monte
Nero, but the Italians held what they had won.
AREA OF GENERAL CADORNA'S SUCCESSFUL
OPERATIONS AGAINST GORIZIA
The Isonzo valley forms the eastern line for the defense of Italy and its possession
was essential to the realization of Italian ideals. Gorizia, its main strategic position, first
fell to the Italians August 9, 1916.
The position was now that Cadorna's left wing was in a strong position, but could not
do much against Tolmino. His center was facing the great camp of Gorizia, while his
right was on the edge of the Carso, and had advanced as far as Dueno, on the
Monfalcone-Trieste Railroad. The army was in position to make an attack upon Gorizia.
On the 2d of July an attack on a broad front was aimed directly at Gorizia. The left was
to swing around against the defenses of Gorizia to the north; the center was directed
against the Gorizia bridge head, and the right was to swing around to the northeast
through the Doberdo plateau. If it succeeded the Trieste railway would be cut and
Gorizia must fall.
Long and confused fighting followed. The center and the right of the Italian army
slowly advanced their line, taking over one thousand prisoners. For days there was
continuous bombardment and counter-bombardment. The fighting on the left was
terrific. In the neighborhood of Plava the Italian forces found themselves opposed by
Hungarian troops, unaccustomed to mountain warfare, who at first fell back. Austrian
reserves came to their aid, and flung back three times the Italian charge.
Three new Italian brigades were brought up, and King Victor Emanuel himself came
to encourage his troops. The final assault carried the heights. On the 22d of July the
Italian right captured the crest of San Michele, which dominates the Doberdo plateau.
Meanwhile the Austrian armies were being heavily reinforced, and General Cadorna
found himself unable to make progress. Much ground had been won but Gorizia was still
unredeemed. Many important vantage points were in Italian hands, but it was difficult to
advance. The result of the three months' campaign was a stalemate. In the high
mountains to the north Italy's campaign was a war of defense. To undertake her
offensive on the Isonzo it was necessary that she guard her flanks and rear. The Tyrolese
battle-ground contained three distinct points where it was necessary to operate; the
Trentino Salient, the passes of the Dolomites, and the passes of the Carnic Alps.
Early in June Italy had won control of the ridges of the mountains in the two latter
points, but the problem in the Trentino was more difficult. It was necessary, because of
the converging valleys, to push her front well inland. On the Carnic Alps the fighting
consisted of unimportant skirmishes. The main struggle centered around the pass of
Monte Croce Carnico.
In two weeks the Alpini had seized dominating positions to the west of the pass, but
the Austrians clung to the farther slopes. A great deal of picturesque fighting went on,
but not much progress was made. Further west in the Dolomite region there was more
fighting. On the 30th of May Cartina had been captured, and the Italians moved north
toward the Pusterthal Railway. Progress was slow, as the main routes to the railway were
difficult.
By the middle of August they were only a few miles from the railway, but all the
routes led through defiles, and the neighboring heights were in the possession of the
Austrians. To capture these heights was a most difficult feat, which the Italians
performed in the most brilliant way; but even after they had passed these defiles success
was not yet won. Each Italian column was in its own grove, with no lateral
communication. The Austrians could mass themselves where they pleased. As a result
the Italian forces were compelled to halt.
In the Trentino campaign the Italians soon captured the passes, and moved against
Trente and Roverito. These towns were heavily fortified, as were their surrounding
heights. The campaign became a series of small fights on mountain peaks and mountain
ridges. Only small bodies of troops could maneuver, and the raising of guns up steep
precipices was extremely difficult. The Italians slowly succeeded in gaining ground, and
established a chain of posts around the heights so that often one would see guns and
barbed wire intrenchments at a height of more than ten thousand feet among the
crevasses of the glaciers. The Alpini performed wonderful feats of physical endurance,
but the plains of Lombardy were still safe.
